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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
INTRODUCTION 
In the 1990’s, international peacebuilding reached its apex in response to civil wars that afflicted 
Rwanda, Mozambique, Somalia, and Yugoslavia. Since then, there has been an increased academic 
focus on postwar democratization. Academics and practitioners alike have queried whether liberal 
peacebuilding operations have been more successful at securing peace than at establishing liberal 
democratic regimes (Zürcher, et. al., 2013). Despite this spiked interest in peacebuilding and 
postwar democracies, little attention is dedicated to a key element of both of these concepts: 
citizens as the source of legitimacy. The legitimacy of any democratic institution is derived from 
the society which it serves (Dagher, 2018) and therefore advocates the assessment of local 
perceptions in research evaluating the state of democracy. This is consequent of the liberal 
assumption that in a democratic regime, the government is an agent of the people, and as thus 
should reflect the will of its citizens (Ozerdem & Lee, 2016).  Public opinion and support for liberal 
democratic ideals and institutions are often overlooked in post-conflict peacebuilding research. 
Scholar David Lake cautions: 
 contrary to the prevailing wisdom, however, legitimacy is not inherent in institutions in 
general nor only in institutions with representative qualities. Institutions are not ‘strong’ 
or accepted by society simply because they are institutions. This puts the proverbial cart 
before the horse.”  (Lake, 2016 p.196) 
 
Post-conflict democratization, however, is not a process led by the governed. In fact, it is a process 
that is rarely even led by those governing. Instead, it is predominantly dictated by international 
actors, who have the capacity and expertise, to oversee, implement, and support a sustainable peace 
process (Ozerdem & Lee, 2016). While this inherently grants international legitimacy, it leaves 
many unanswered questions regarding shared beliefs, process, and performance legitimacy 
(Dagher, 2018). Do people even want democracy?  How does their perception of the means, 
peacebuilding and democratization, impact their perceptions of the results, democracy? Gathering 
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and analyzing qualitative data from semi-structured interviews, this study seeks to explore the 
relationship between the two and develop a theory that can answer the following question:  How 
have local perceptions of post-conflict democratization and peacebuilding strategies 
impacted perceptions of democracy? 
 
This research will be focused on a single case study, Bosnia and Herzegovina.1 While the results 
are not generalizable, their application and relevance extend far beyond this singular case. They 
will have implications for all levels of actors involved in the development of peacebuilding and 
democratization tactics in post-conflict societies. With this data, local and state actors can better 
understand how their own constituents view the process and the institutions around them – 
allowing them to address any issues or problems. Moreover, it is an opportunity for international 
organizations to evaluate how their macro-level initiatives are viewed at a micro-level, and the 
implications that they may have for self-sufficiency, sustainability, and above all - legitimacy. For 
Western powers, such as the United States and the European Union, who often play the largest 
roles in post-conflict democratic transitions, this study can be used as a new form of evaluating 
peacebuilding initiatives.  
 
To this point, extensive work has been done on the process of post-conflict democratization. 
Predominantly, this work has focused on the process of peacebuilding and democratization, and 
on the outcomes in terms of sustainability of peace, the state and its institutions (Zürcher, 2011; 
Ohlson & Kovacs, 2009; Chandler, 2017; Culbertson, 2010). The aim of this research is to 
investigate how citizens in post-conflict, transition countries perceive democracy in terms of 
institutions, implementation, values, and theoretically. This seeks to link existing work on 
legitimacy and democracy (Dagher, 2018; Zürcher, 2011) to work on the post-conflict peace 
process (Chesterman, 2005; Kostic, 2008), and develop a theory using locals, or individual 
citizens, as the main level of analysis. This approach will complement Earl Conteh-Morgan’s 
constructivist approach to peacebuilding (2005), calling for integration of bottom up approaches 
in post-conflict peacebuilding.  In the aftermath of a war, the manner in which ordinary citizens 
perceive the system and institutions around them can determine the sustainability of that peace and 
                                               
1 From this point forward, Bosnia and Herzegovina will be referred to as Bosnia.  
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system once the external actors have departed. With a lack of existing research on the impact of 
peacebuilding and democratization processes on citizen’s perceptions of democracy, this study 
will focus on the perception and understanding of democratic values and institutions at a local 
level, aiming to develop a theory that can be further explored and tested in future studies.  
ORGANIZATION OF THESIS  
The field of conflict resolution is notoriously hampered by a lack of a general consensus on 
terminology (Wohlfeld, 2010, p. 26).  Before delving into the theoretical framework, Chapter 2 
will introduce and define various concepts that are fundamental to this study and discuss their 
relevant literature in the scope of this paper and its goals. The existing literature on peacebuilding 
and democratization will be introduced in this chapter. The chapter will end by introducing existing 
studies on these themes, identifying the gap in this literature, and justifying the need for theory 
development to answer the proposed research question.  
 
This thesis uses a constructivist framework to argue for a greater emphasis on the perspectives of 
ordinary citizens in both the implementation and the study of peacebuilding and democratization. 
Constructivism, as conceptualized by scholar Alexander Wendt (1992, 1999), will be introduced 
in Chapter 3. It will then be applied to the level of analysis used in this research, particularly 
founded in the work of Earl Conteh-Morgan (2005). Using his 2005 work, a constructivist 
approach to peacebuilding will be outlined. Finally, Chapter 3 will introduce the two preliminary 
hypotheses of this study.  
  
A theory development methodology will be employed using a single case study, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Chapter 4 will elaborate on the methodology and detail the data collection and 
analysis. This section will expand on the decision and justification for use of a case study in this 
theory development research. Next, it will detail the main source of data: semi-structured 
interviews collected during two research trips. The structure of the interviews and sampling 
methods. The most robust portion of the methodology is the method of analysis. Leaning heavily 
on the work of Johnny Saldaña (2009), this research will use a multistage coding process to analyze 
the data gathered from interviews.  
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Before attempting to analyze democratization, peacebuilding, or the perception of citizens, a 
certain level of historical context of the case study is required.  Chapter 5 provides the necessary 
framework, beginning with a socialist Yugoslavia and continuing to the state of present day 
Bosnia. This chapter will explain the causes of the war including the death of Josip Broz Tito, and 
exploitation of ethno-nationalism. Furthermore, it will elaborate on the Dayton Peace Treaty that 
brought the war to an end, its implementation, and the state of Bosnia today.  
  
Chapter 6 begins with an outline of the results, loosely following the structure developed in the 
Sample Questionnaire (see Appendix 1).  
  
In Chapter 7, the results will be discussed and used to develop new hypotheses. The conclusion of 
this thesis will summarize the findings of this research, with an emphasis on how they can be 
applied in future research.  
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CHAPTER 2: CONCEPTS AND LITERATURE 
REVIEW 
THIS BRINGS ME TO A SECOND POINT – THE NATURE OF THE PEACE THAT WE SEEK. FOR 
PEACE IS NOT MERELY THE ABSENCE OF VISIBLE CONFLICT. ONLY A JUST PEACE BASED ON THE 
INHERENT RIGHTS AND DIGNITY OF EVERY INDIVIDUAL CAN TRULY BE LASTING.  
BARACK H. OBAMA, NOBEL LECTURE, OSLO, 10 DECEMBER, 2009.  
WHAT KIND OF PEACE? 
At first glance, defining ‘peacebuilding’ may seem an easy task. You build peace, simple enough. 
This modest task becomes much more complex, however, when one tries to define peace. 
Politicians, musicians, and religious leaders have all discussed the concept of peace at length, and 
one can conclude that John Lennon's imagined peace differs vastly from Immanuel Kant's. In order 
to develop a strategy for building peace in a post-conflict society, there needs to be a common 
understanding, a clear goal, of what that truly entails.  
 
In the field of conflict management, John Galtung (1969, p. 183-184) has classified two types of 
peace - negative and positive peace. A negative peace is the lack of war, or absence of personal 
violence. A positive peace is the absence of structural violence, which includes" poverty, unjust 
social, political, and economic institutions, systems, or structures (1969, p. 168)."  If international 
involvement were to cease once the war or conflict ended, it is very likely that the violence would 
soon resume. However, a post-conflict mission seeking to abolish all forms of structural violence 
would be far too ambitious. In agreement with Roland Paris (2004, p. 58), the aims of any 
peacebuilding mission should lie somewhere in the between these two extremes, though finding 
the right balance has proved to be a challenge.  
 
Post-conflict peacebuilding encompasses a wide-range of goals that can be loosely split into four 
components – security, development, humanitarian assistance, governance and rule of law 
(Newman, Paris, & Richmond, 2009, p. 8-9). Beyond these goals is one final objective: self-
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sufficiency (Jeong, 2005, p. 21).  For any peacebuilding process to be truly sustainable, programs 
and projects must be designed and implemented in a manner in which the post-conflict society can 
come to uphold without external international support. This makes the transition from international 
support to self-sufficiency a fundamental process of peacebuilding.  
 
With diversity of goals and initiatives, peacebuilding intrinsically incorporates a myriad of actors 
at various levels: international, national, and local. In the scope of this study, international actors 
include international organizations, foreign states, and NGOs. The term ‘local actors’ will 
encompass both national and local level actors such as local governance, community leaders, 
NGOs, state government, security and defense forces. Finally, the focal point of this research will 
be locals, the ordinary everyday people within a state.  
PEACEBUILDING: THE EVOLUTION  
The 1990's rise of the liberal peacebuilding model as a standard for peacebuilding can be credited 
to the prominence of North American and European actors in international aid and interventions 
post-Cold War (Ozerdem & Lee, 2016, p. 39). This model was founded on the principles of the 
liberal peace theory, also known as the “democratic peace”, which asserts that liberal values – 
democracy, international organizations, and free economies, are the foundations for lasting peace 
(Kant, 1970). Liberal peace theorists have long maintained that democracies rarely go to war with 
one another (Doyle, 2005).  Some go a step further and ambitiously claim that democratic systems 
are more peaceful than authoritarian systems (Russett & Oneal, 2001). The idea behind this is that 
democracy allows for the resolution of conflict without violence. These two claims can be applied 
to peacebuilding. If democracies rarely go to war with one another, then one could decrease the 
occurrence of inter-state wars by increasing the number of democracies. Furthermore, if 
democratic systems are more peaceful, then this would decrease the occurrence of intra-state 
conflicts.  
  
The liberal peacebuilding model has become a trending topic for criticism in conflict management. 
Many academics have been critical of this model, claiming that it employs a "one size fits all" 
approach (Newman, Richmond, & Paris, 2009), fosters dependency on international institutions 
(Chandler, 1999, p. 154), and others cite its adherence to statebuilding with little regard to 
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nationbuilding (Kostic, 2008). One of the most prominent points of debates regarding this model, 
has been its use of a top-down approach, rather than a local led bottom-up approach (Autesserre, 
2005; 2017; Chandler, 1999, 2006; Hellmüller, 2013; McMahon, 2017; Ottoway, 2007; Swain, 
Amer, & Ojendal, 2009).  
  
The overreaching role of external actors in liberal peacebuilding is another source of concern 
(Schmidt, 2008). During post-conflict interventions, international actors tend to impose or force 
democratization, regardless of existing conditions or the preference of citizens. In a study on 
peacebuilding in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sara Hellmüller (2013) found that in 
situations where priorities of various levels of actors (local and international) are askew, it is the 
international actors that often dominate.  Local actors are limited in capacity, resulting in their 
compliance with the demands of international actors. This top-down approach presents a 
disconnect between how international actors perceive democracy functions domestically, in their 
own nations through self-determination, versus its coerced establishment in post-conflict states. 
(Ottoway, 2007; Swain, Amer, & Ojendal, 2009).  
  
By taking on a predominantly top-down approach, it is easy to overlook the nationbuilding aspects 
of peacebuilding. The risk is that international actors will assume to know what is best for the local 
communities without accounting for their norms, cultures, and history. This can create a culture of 
resistance that may very well impede on the peace process, as was seen in the Congo where the 
failure to incorporate local agendas led to insurgencies and continued violence that destabilized 
the country and undermined the peace process (Autesserre, 2005; Hellmüller, 2013). Local 
resistance does not necessarily entail negative sentiments towards intervening parties, at times it 
is due to locals’ inabilities to relate to the core principles of programs implemented (Lee, 2015, p. 
1447). 
  
Lessons learned in Bosnia (Chandler, 2006), and Rwanda, (Doyle & Sambanis, 2006), did not fall 
on deaf ears. In the last two decades the peace process has evolved, taking what has been called a 
'local turn' in peacebuilding (Chandler, 2017; Leonardsson & Rudd, 2015). A hybrid model, 
mixing both top-down and bottom-up approaches, has surfaced (Mac Ginty, 2010; Wallis, 2012). 
In response, others warned that localization of peacebuilding has been romanticized (Paffenholz, 
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2015), and may be just as ineffective as the traditional top-down approach (McMahon, 2017; 
Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, & Miall, 2011). This is not a choice between one or the other, instead 
this thesis calls for the integration of top-down and bottom-up approaches, building local capacity 
within international systems (Autesserre, 2010; Richmond & Mitchell, 2011). 
  
David Chandler's most recent work claims that the latest evolution in peacebuilding has been a 
pragmatic approach, that effectively takes 'peacebuilding' off of the international agenda (2017). 
He goes on to blame the 1990's criticisms, based on 'grand narratives of liberal internationalism' 
for discrediting the 'distinct policy sphere' of peacebuilding (Chandler, 2017, p. 203). 
Peacebuilding has, as Chandler noted, slipped from focus on the world stage. It has even been a 
source of recent discussion, as Permanent Observer of the Holy See to the United Nations, 
Archbishop Benardito Auza proclaimed that the 'United Nations can and should recommit itself 
to, and scale up, its peacebuilding efforts2' (2018).  
  
As I see it, Chandler fails to take into account today's reality. Liberal peacebuilding emerged at the 
end of the Cold War. Since then the peace process has traditionally been understood as a Western-
led initiative (Mac Ginty, 2010). The world stage has changed considerably since the end of the 
Cold War and there are new actors in the field of peace and security. Non-Western nations, such 
as Japan, India, Korea, and China have become significant players in development assistance, and 
make substantial contributions to post-conflict states (OECD, 2018; Shinoda, 2018). Literature on 
peacebuilding rarely accounts for this. The few exceptions (De Carvalho & De Coning, 2013; 
Iwami, 2016; Richmond & Tellidis, 2013) point out that Non-Western approaches and agendas in 
post-conflict states differ from those of the EU or the US. China's strategy in Africa exemplifies 
two key features of this: principles of non-intervention, and a statebuilding approach focused on 
infrastructure and economic growth (Alden & Large, 2013; Lei, 2011). This offers approach to 
peace and security, provides an alternative to the classical model of peacebuilding. There is a lack 
of literature that looks at the impact that this alternative approach has had on the evolution of 
peacebuilding. Without properly analyzing these relationships, Chandler's claim that 'political' 
criticisms of peacebuilding have discredited peacebuilding is hasty at best. Peacebuilding has not 
                                               
2 Emphasis added 
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been abandoned nor discredited. Instead, I argue that it is evolving in response to a new 
international reality, different actors, and lessons learned. As such, the discourse on peacebuilding 
must also evolve.  
DEFINING THE AMBIGUOUS: STATEBUILDING AND 
NATIONBUILDING 
Peacebuilding, statebuilding, and nationbuilding are three concepts that are intrinsically 
intertwined. Often times in literature they are used interchangeably. For Simon Chesterman (2005), 
they are essentially different words that roughly describe the same thing. Different actors prefer to 
use different terms, depending on whom they are speaking to and what they want to convey 
(Chesterman, 2005, p. 4-5). However, Chesterman fails to realize that nationbuilding and 
statebuilding are, in fact, two fundamentally distinct, but equally necessary, processes of 
peacebuilding. They are essentially two sides of the same coin.  
 
Statebuilding is the establishment of political, legal, economic and administrative institutions and 
the provision of security and resources to the public (Kostic, 2008). Nationbuilding has a broader 
goal of creating a sense of social cohesion, political culture, and a national identity (Ozerdam & 
Lee, 2016).  In instances of social division or ethnic conflicts, nationbuilding plays a particularly 
crucial role, as it focuses on the construction of a national identity and on overcoming divisions. 
State-building measures alone cannot succeed in these instances if they cannot counter the 
disputing patterns of social identity (von Bogdandy et. al., 2005, p. 587).  
 
Many see nationbuilding as part of the reconciliatory stage of the peace process (Lund, 1996). This 
in itself is not an issue.  Much of what nationbuilding entails justice, social cohesion, are part of 
the reconciliation phase. However, this becomes an issue when nationbuilding is seen as something 
that comes only at the end of the peacebuilding process, and only in the reconciliatory stage. 
Stressing the need for cohesion between the two approaches, Lemay-Hebert (2009) argues that 
nationbuilding and statebuilding should be understood as one single process and without 
distinction.  
 
As well-meaning as this sentiment is, it is quite dangerous. In peacebuilding, it is essential to 
prioritize some elements over others. By lumping all nationbuilding and statebuilding activities 
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under one term, it increases the likelihood that one will be prioritized over the other.  Rather, I 
argue that statebuilding and nationbuilding must be recognized and as two separate and necessary 
cogs of a machine, both of which are necessary in order to build a functioning and durable peace.  
DEMOCRACY, DEMOCRATIZATION, AND LEGITIMACY 
Democratization, like the liberal peacebuilding model, is based on the Western theory of the liberal 
peace. International actors have applied this theoretical framework to promote peace and stability 
through post-conflict peacebuilding efforts. The debates in the field of democratization are not due 
to preference for another political system over a democratic one. Most academics would agree, 
theoretically speaking, that a well-established democratic system is the ideal route to sustainable 
peace and development in post-conflict societies (Swain, Amer, &Ojendal, 2009 ), as it provides 
a framework that can manage conflicting interests without violence (Ottaway, 2007), allows for a 
peaceful transition of power, and values human rights (Ohlson & Kovacs, 2009). 
 
Instead, it is the process of democratization, the transition from an authoritarian system to a 
democratic system, that prompts criticism. (Swain, Amer, & Ojendal, 2009; Carlson & Turner, 
2009; Jung, 2012).  During the process of democratization, international actors focus on the 
establishment of institutions and the development of a democratic constitution and policies 
(Chandler, 1999; McMahon & Western, 2009; Paris, 2004).  However, the success of post-conflict 
democratization is rather disheartening (Zürcher, 2011). Recent examples, such as Nigeria and 
South Sudan, show that democratization has rarely proven to be a linear process (Frahm, 2017). 
This is particularly a concern in post-conflict societies where the institutions needed to foster 
democracy are weak and lacking (Zürcher, 2011), making them more susceptible to renewed 
conflict and aggression. 
 
Again, peacebuilding is plagued by another ambiguous term: democracy. The definition often 
varies from state to state (Parra-Rosales, 2009), and person to person (Pietsch, Miller, & Karp, 
2015). Admittedly, the aim of liberal peacebuilding and democratization is the establishment of a 
liberal democracy. However, few post-conflict countries reach that benchmark (Zürcher, et. al., 
2013, p. 8), and instead are lucky to reach the threshold for an electoral democracy. Electoral 
democracies are countries that have minimum standards for political rights and civil liberties, 
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while liberal democracies practice a more robust observance of democratic ideals and a wider array 
of civil liberties (Freedom House, 2018). In other words, electoral democracies meet the minimum 
institutional and procedural requirements, but lack the liberal values and freedoms of liberal 
democracies. Often, local elites act as spoilers stagnating the democratization process, when the 
cost of adopting democracy may to be too high, as it does not guarantee that they retain power 
(Zürcher, 2011, p. 91).  
 
Democracy needs legitimacy, which is gathered from four interconnected sources: shared beliefs, 
international legitimacy, performance legitimacy, and process legitimacy (Dagher, 2018). 
International legitimacy stems from international recognition. In post-conflict states this is 
inherently earned to some extent, as the international actors that are participating in the peace 
process will to give recognition in order to do so. Process legitimacy is earned through the 
establishment of institutions and frequent elections. The haste with which elections are conducted 
in post-conflict states has been a significant source of criticism due to its consequences, and 
competition between former enemies (Autesserre, 2014; Bennett, 2016). In response, it has been 
argued that minimum preconditions, such as structural and institutional requirements, should be 
met before a post-conflict state can democratize (Ottoway, 2007; Hippler, 2008; Schmidt, 2008). 
In fact, experts have suggested that U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) should 
focus more its aid on nationbuilding and less on democratization, claiming that in the developing 
world, democracy is a “luxury good” (Boot & Miklaucic, 2016).   
 
The creation of institutions alone does not make a democracy. To put it in the words of Zbigniew 
Brzezinski, “building a house is not the same as establishing a home” (1995, p.1). In addition to 
institutions, for a democracy to properly function, the state needs to be recognized and legitimized 
by the people through shared beliefs. The challenge that transitioning, post-conflict states face is 
the introduction of a new political framework without the necessary political culture. Political 
culture can loosely be translated as willingness to participate and to live by the rules of democracy 
(Schmidt, 2008, p. 112). For democracy to thrive, there needs to be a local demand for it (Parra-
Rosales, 2009; Zürcher, 2011) This is increasingly difficult in societies that are severely divided 
and have not properly reconciled. 
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The final source of legitimacy, is performance legitimacy. It can only be achieved when three 
requirements have been met: the state must know the interests of its citizens, meet their 
expectations, and finally, the state must establish and maintain the capacity to provide basic 
services (Dagher, 2018 p. 91-93). To be a functioning democracy, the government must act as an 
agency that represents the will of the people it governs. However, immediately after war, post-
conflict states do not possess the capacity to provide all of these needs, further supporting the 
argument that post-conflict states should meet preset requirements before moving toward the path 
to democratization (Ottoway, 2007).  
THE MISSING LINK: PERCEPTION 
There is a substantial collection of research on the processes of post-conflict peacebuilding and 
democratization, and the resulting democracy. This research contributes to the development of 
various arguments and theories of democratization and peacebuilding. However, its overwhelming 
focus on macro-level outcomes is a considerable limitation. Little, if any, literature on post-conflict 
peacebuilding and democratization takes into account public perception of the established 
democracy and its legitimacy.   
 
This is not to say that there is no existing research on public perceptions and legitimacy of liberal 
peacebuilding, or democracy. Researchers have analyzed public opinion polls in Europe 
(Anderson & Guillory, 1997) and Latin America (Sødal, 2012) and found that citizens’ perceptions 
of political institutions and economic situations in their country impact their satisfaction with 
democracy. However, these studies are focused on regions, rather than post-conflict states. A 
recent empirical study has focused on the public perceptions of democracy in post-conflict 
societies, linking the relationship between a citizen’s exposure to violence and their support of 
liberal values (Dyrstad, 2013).  This link between insecurity and willingness to sacrifice freedoms 
or rights is paramount to understanding perceptions of democracy in a society recovering from 
war. However, Dyrstad focuses only on security in terms of absence of violence and overlooks 
other aspects such as economic, political, and social needs. When the needs of citizens have not 
been met, whether in the economic, social or political realm, they see themselves at risk. Pietsch, 
Miller, and Karp (2015) claim that citizens are more apt to sacrifice some of their freedoms for the 
sake of effective governance, political order, and economic necessity. These studies address the 
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individual concepts of this research. What they fail to do is link them to one another. While useful, 
none of this existing literature offers a theory that can explain the impact of peacebuilding on local 
perceptions of democracy.  
PEACEBUILDING AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN BOSNIA 
Bosnia has often been used as a focal point for peacebuilding and democratization research. 
However, in most cases, the level of analysis is either at state level, or project level (Gillard, 2001; 
Merlingen & Ostrauskaite, 2005). Chandler’s 1999 Bosnia: Faking Democracy After Dayton, 
provides a strong analysis of the processes of peacebuilding and democratization in Bosnia. Others 
have focused on the implications that Dayton has had for the peace process and democratization 
(McMahon & Western, 2009; Richmond & Franks, 2012). However, these studies focus on the 
institutions and political structure, rather than on the individuals within the society, and their 
understanding of democracy.  
 
Much like the broader literature on peacebuilding, studies on the peacebuilding process in Bosnia 
fail to incorporate the role of international actors beyond EU, UN, and the US. The various ethnic 
groups in Bosnia have long had close ties with Non-Western powers, such as the Bosnian Serbs 
with Russia (Sito-Sucic, 2018) or the Bosnian Muslims with Turkey (Armstrong, 2018). While the 
influence and involvement of these Non-Western actors may not be as pronounced as those of the 
Western actors, does not mean that they have not been present. Omitting the role that these actors 
play and the influence that they have at the local level presents a curtailed account of the peace 
process in Bosnia.  
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CHAPTER 3:  THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
PEACE CANNOT BE KEPT BY FORCE. IT CAN ONLY BE ACHIEVED BY UNDERSTANDING. 
ALBERT EINSTEIN, COSMIC RELIGION (1931), P. 32. 
 
The overarching framework of this study is based on the constructivist theory of international 
relations. Constructivism, as explained by Wendt (1999), specifies that while the world exists in 
an anarchic system, states are still constrained by an international structure which is shaped and 
molded by the behavior and identity of states. A state’s identities and behaviors are shaped by 
collective beliefs, history, norms, and social identities of the individuals within that state. 
Consequently, as norms and beliefs evolve, so do identities and interests, and eventually these lead 
to changes to the international structure. Alliances and coalitions are therefore a product of 
collective identity and interests, while conflict, both violent and non-violent, is more prevalent in 
nations with contrasting identities (Wendt, 1999, p. 975). This is not to say that power and interests 
are not relevant in international relations. It is the socially constructed understanding of power and 
interests that ultimately shapes the stage of world politics.  
THE CONSTRUCTIVIST APPROACH TO PEACEBUILDING  
Wendt uses his Constructivist model as a lens, through which to analyze the actions between states, 
at an international level. This lens, however, can be focused further – at state level.  For the goals 
of this research, a constructivist framework gives us basis through which to understand the 
occurrence of conflict, and in turn how to build peace. In sharp contrast to liberals or realists, 
constructivists focus on the individuals within a society as the agents that shape a state’s relations 
through development of identity, a sentiment deeply embedded in the constructivist peacebuilding 
approach. A constructivist approach to peacebuilding shifts the focus from relations between 
states, to relations within a state, and to the individual. As Earl Conteh-Morgan (2005 p. 70) 
explains, peace efforts often view the individual as “the means to political stability as opposed to 
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being the end of all peacebuilding efforts.” Instead, efforts should be focused on realizing human 
security at the personal, institutional, and cultural-structural levels. To achieve this, Conteh-
Morgan outlines three fundamental arguments of the constructivist perspective of peacebuilding. 
 
First, an interpretive bottom-up approach should be imbedded into the peace process (Conteh-
Morgan, 2005, p. 72). In other words, peacebuilding requires interpreting the needs and 
insecurities from the perspectives of the individuals. As previously discussed, resistance can occur 
when locals fail to see their interests reflected in the peacebuilding process (Autesserre, 2015; 
Hellmüller, 2013; Lee, 2015). While peacebuilders bring experience and expertise to post-conflict 
states, they also bring their own culture. This includes both their individual culture, one shaped by 
their community and experience, and a shared culture of international peacebuilders, embedded 
with its own beliefs, taboos, rules, and world understanding (Autesserre, 2015). This culture, like 
any other, shapes their understandings and expectations of peace, development, and reconciliation. 
While this is natural and to be expected, the trouble arises when this cultural understanding eclipses 
the local culture, needs, and expectations. This constructivist approach does not demand a fully 
bottom up approach, rather it calls for the integration of bottom up approaches into the peace 
process. The procedure of peacebuilding is founded in the creation and establishment of new 
norms. However, this needs to be done in a manner that is compatible with the existing cultural 
framework.  
 
Second, both material and ideational factors must be considered and adapted within the peace 
process (Conteh-Morgan, 2005, p. 76). Earl Adler (1997, p. 322) defines constructivism as the 
view that “the manner in which the material world shapes and is shaped by human interaction 
and depends on dynamic normative and epistemic interpretations of the material 
world.” 3Constructivist peacebuilding emphasizes the understanding that shaping or building 
peace, depends on the way that those experiencing it, the locals, interpret the material world and 
the conflict. The reigning approach to contemporary peacebuilding is the liberal peacebuilding 
model. A constructivist analysis of the democratic peace also looks past the institution-building 
and liberal identification of liberal peacebuilding, at the process through which states develop a 
                                               
3 Emphasis from original source.  
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collective identity (Kahl, 1998). This reflects the needs to integrate both nationbuilding and 
statebuilding approaches. Again, this does not suggest that the material needs, such as institutions 
or security, are not of importance. Rather, this encourages the peace process to address the 
immaterial, such as enabling the development of a national identity, or fostering an appreciation 
for liberal values. The political culture and a shared identity alone will not establish peace. 
However, these ideational factors can dictate whether some actions are possible or even 
improbable within that culture (Autesserre, 2015, p. 29-30).  
 
Finally, peacebuilding needs to move beyond immediate goals, such as achieving a negative peace 
and election monitoring (Conteh-Morgan, 2005, p. 72). Instead, it must focus on a lasting and 
sustainable positive peace. This requires planning past the initial goals of personal security and 
addressing possible sources of future conflict embedded in social and institutional insecurities.  
INITIAL HYPOTHESES 
Based on the literature and concepts discussed above, two preliminary hypotheses have been 
developed. These will be used as starting points. In this paper I refer to them as ‘initial hypotheses’ 
(IH) however, they may be better described as starting points or hunches. They are narrow enough 
to give the study a direction, and yet broad enough that they allow the emergence of new concepts 
and variables. While these concepts will be used for initial interviews and data collection, it is 
necessary to note that these are quite likely to change and develop as the data is analyzed. 
 
Initial Hypothesis 1 pulls from the nationbuilding versus statebuilding discussion (Chesterman, 
2005; Kostic, 2008; Lemay-Hebert, 2009). It makes the assumption that locals who prioritize 
nationbuilding initiatives place a greater importance on ideational factors and therefore, they will 
hold liberal values in higher regard than institutions in the process of democratization. 
 
IH.1:  Locals who prioritize nationbuilding over statebuilding initiatives in peacebuilding 
will place a greater value on liberal ideals than democratic institutions in the 
democratization process.   
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Peacebuilding requires that personal, institutional, and cultural-structural insecurities are 
addressed (Conteh-Morgan, 2005). When the peace process fails to provide these securities, locals 
will perceive themselves to be at risk. This sense of insecurity in turn, impacts the way in which 
locals perceive their political situation, and the state. If they feel that their new political system has 
failed to provide personal, institutional, or cultural-structural this thesis stipulates that local will 
become skeptical of its institutions and ideals.  
 
IH.2: Locals who still feel at risk due to stagnant or unfulfilled peacebuilding initiatives 
are more likely to be skeptical of democratic institutions and ideals. 
 
.   
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CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH DESIGN AND 
METHODOLOGY  
SINGLE CASE THEORY DEVELOPMENT 
There is a considerable gap in literature when it comes to the impact that democratization and 
peacebuilding have on the perceptions of democracy at a local level. This study will aim to address 
this and to identify indicators that can be tested in following studies. To do so, this study research 
will employ a single case theory development methodology.  Theory development by means of a 
case study is an inductive process aimed at developing provisional conclusions that can later be 
tested against new data or a different case (George & Bennett, 2005 p, 90).  
 
As is evident from Chapter 2, the concepts in this study, such as peace and democracy, are broad 
and difficult to measure. Case studies allow for a deeper conceptual refinement of these notions, 
where statistical studies run face the risk of “conceptual stretching” (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 
19-22). Most importantly, case studies allow for the exploration of new variables and development 
of theory. While this thesis begins with two preliminary hypotheses, the nature of this research is 
such that expects these to evolve with the emergence of new variables and patterns in the data.  
 
Bosnia and Herzegovina will be used as the case study for this theory development study. The 
1995 Dayton Peace Agreement brought an end to the violent war that plagued Bosnia and set the 
framework for a democratic state and liberal peacebuilding efforts in the post-conflict country 
(Darweish & Rank, 2012; Paris, 2011). Since the implementation of Dayton, EU involvement in 
the Balkan state has become part of the landscape- ranging widely in activities such as EUFOR 
Althea, EU Policing Mission, and through its role in the OHR. These efforts focused on neo-liberal 
economic reforms, holding elections, and democratic consolidation (Bennett, 2016; Chandler, 
1999). Peacebuilding is a long-term process that takes place over the course of many years. It has 
been over two decades since the conflict ended in Bosnia. Identities and values of a nation, as 
addressed in the constructivist framework of this research, evolve over time. This makes Bosnia 
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they key case in which to study the impact of peacebuilding processes and to evaluate the impact 
that they have had on public perceptions of liberal democratic values. Admittedly, a single case 
study lacks the representativeness afforded by a large-N studies (George & Bennett, 2005 p. 31; 
Reichertz, 2014) however the purpose is to develop a theory for future testing (Eisenhardt & 
Graebner, 2007). 
DATA COLLECTION  
The primary source of data for this study was collected through a series of semi-structured 
interviews. The inductive nature of this research required that the interviews be conducted in such 
a manner that answers can be fluid and unrestricted. In order to provide the degree of control 
needed to guide and analyze the data, a semi-structured approach was necessary with various open-
ended core questions to prompt the interviewee (Galletta, 2013, p. 37). 
 
The interviews were conducted in three stages. After doing considerable research on existing 
literature on peacebuilding and democratization, I formulated several initial hypotheses. I then 
began with several unstructured and informal interviews. These interviews allowed me to get a 
deeper understanding of the particular situation in Bosnia and aided in the development of the 
initial hypotheses. I then developed a standard questionnaire (see Appendix A.1 for sample of 
questionnaire), based on information from preliminary interviews and initial hypotheses. These 
questions included biographical questions, to provide insight into the participant’s experiences, 
and concept questions, focused towards gauging their perceptions of post-conflict peacebuilding 
strategies, democracy, and other relevant concepts. Again, I stress that this was only a guiding 
questionnaire. When conducting semi-structured interviews, it is expected that the questions are 
amended or reordered to allow for a more natural flow of conversation (Castillo-Montoya, 2016; 
Edwards & Holland, 2013, p. 29). I began the analysis of the data as the interviews were conducted, 
searching for developing concepts and then revised the questionnaire as necessary. After further 
analysis of the data, several follow up interviews were conducted, to clarify any unclear responses 
or pose questions that arose after the original interview.  
 
The data for this research was collected in Sarajevo during two separate visits. Throughout the 
course of the fieldwork, conducted 12 semi-structured interviews, 10 unstructured and informal 
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interviews, and several follow-up interviews were conducted. A multistage purposeful sampling 
strategy was used in the selection of the interviewees.  I began with a snowball sampling method, 
through participants were identified with the help of various existing academic and social contacts 
in Bosnia. Snowball sampling is not ideal, as it presents the risk of selection bias and does not 
guarantee proper representation of the sample group (Emmel, 2013, p. 131). However, due to time 
constraints it was the most feasible option. The last stage of the sampling method was opportunistic 
or emergent sampling – this strategy allows for samples to be selected as opportunities arise during 
fieldwork (Emmel, 2013, p. 41). During my time in Bosnia, I often met people who expressed a 
willingness to participate or contribute to my work and this method allowed for the flexibility to 
take advantage of these unexpected opportunities during my fieldwork. 
 
Admittedly, this research faced several limitations, the most significant due to cost and time. This 
study would have benefitted from a wider range of participants. I had initially intended to conduct 
interviews in several different cities and villages in the Federation and Republika Srpska, I soon 
found this to be far beyond my capabilities in the limited time. Instead, I focused my research in 
the capital city of Sarajevo.  
 
The interviews were mostly conducted at local cafes, of the interviewee’s choice. The logic behind 
this decision was to put participants at ease, in an environment in which they felt comfortable 
(Edward & Holland, 2013, p. 4n; Varraich, 2017). As I met most of the participants for the first 
time at the time of the interviews, I assured them that false names would be used when sharing the 
results of the research (Brandt & Eiro, 2017).  I sought to digitally record the interviews, 
establishing this base of trust and security seemed of particular importance. Table A.1 (found in 
Appendix 2) outlines the date and location of each interview, as well as each interviewee’s age, 
gender, ethnicity, occupation, and war experience. 
METHOD OF ANALYSIS 
This inductive research study requires that the hypotheses and theory be constructed from the data. 
This methodology requires a constant level of analysis and adaptation. Rather than awaiting the 
collection of all the data before commencing the analysis, it requires that the analysis be done 
throughout the various stages of collection. This allowed for modification of the interview 
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questionnaire such as the inclusion of arising concepts, new questions, or the rewording of certain 
questions. When conducting qualitative research, especially with theory development 
methodologies, one can easily become overwhelmed with an influx of information, ideas, 
concepts, and themes. To deter this from happening, I used a coding method to structure the 
analytical process. Interview transcripts and field notes are reviewed and coded. From these codes, 
categories are created. These categories then lead to themes and concepts that are applied to 
develop a theory or provision.   
 
Coding, as described by Johnny Saldaña (2009), is often conducted in two separate cycles. In the 
first cycle of the multiple coding method, I began with Attributes Coding. At the end of each 
interview, or as I transcribed them, I coded the interviews with basic descriptive information. This 
included participant demographics, such as age, gender, and ethnicity; interview logistics such as 
date, location, and length of interview; and a concept index list of the major themes or categories 
identified during the interview (Saldaña, 2009 p. 164). The participant demographics and interview 
logistics act as control variables - as any of factors may impact the responses that participants give, 
and how they give them. Unexpected patterns may emerge from these factors that could be worth 
investigating further (Bazeley, 2010). As this study is based on a small number of interviews, I did 
not use computerized data analysis.  However, should this research be conducted in the future with 
a larger sample size and greater resources, a computerized data analysis could prove to be useful.  
 
As this research is focused on the perception, values, and understanding of individuals, a 
combination of Initial Coding and Values Coding Methods were applied (Saldaña, 2009, p. 83, 
90). Initial Coding is to be done instinctively, without much thought and can be a short phrase to 
summarize initial impression. Using the Values Coding technique, four preliminary labels, 
experience, values, attitudes, and needs, were used to code units. The experience label included 
occurrences before, during, or after the war that might have an impact on their needs, values, or 
attitudes. Socialist, liberal, identity, and nationalistic values were all coded under Values.  The 
Attitudes label was used to code opinions of participants. To name a few, this included opinions 
of the war, current state of Bosnia, democracy, socialism, and the post-conflict peacebuilding 
activities. From this I was able to induce interviewees’ perceptions of the peacebuilding process, 
democratization, and liberal values. Coded under the needs label were immediate post-conflict, 
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reconciliatory, and present-day needs. This is where I was able to identify whether or not 
participants still felt at risk, and what kind of insecurity they faced. During the Initial Coding 
process, I noticed, and had expected, that certain elements of possible categories were emerging 
from the data. I used sub-codes to label these with specific referents (e.g. nationbuilding, 
statebuilding, liberal). Once I completed the coding, I grouped the codes using the four preliminary 
labels, making it easier to analyze and look for patterns.  
 
In the second cycle of coding a Focused Coding Method is applied. I used the sub-codes from the 
initial labeling to categorize the more significant or frequent codes based on themes or concepts 
(Charmaz, 2006; Saldaña, 2009). Once the interviews were coded and categorized, I was able to 
review and compare the data looking for themes and patterns, which I then used to formulate my 
final provisions. Table 1 provides a quick review of the analysis process; for a detailed example 
of the coding process, see Appendix 3.   
 
TABLE 1: OVERVIEW STEPS OF ANALYSIS 
Preparation 1st Cycle Coding 2nd Cycle Coding Analysis 
Transcription Step 1: Attribute Coding 
Step 2: 
Initial and Values Coding 
2nd Cycle: 
Focused Coding 
Analyze and 
Review 
Use digital 
recorder to 
review and 
transcribe 
interviews. 
Field notes also 
integrated with 
transcript. 
Basic descriptive 
information, 
demographics,  
 
Ex: Name, Age, 
Gender, Ethnicity, 
Occupation, 
Interview Time and 
Location, Concept 
Index 
Initial Coding: 
Short phrase to Summarize Unit 
 
Ex: Tito Provided Security,  
 
Values Coding: 
Values Ex: Liberal Values, National Identity, Prioritize 
Personal Freedom, Community Oriented 
 
Attitudes:  Ex: International Community Responsible 
for war, Tito Provided Security, Accustomed to Aid 
 
Needs:  Ex: Economic Security, Justice, Physical 
Security, Housing, Family Reunification 
 
Experiences: Ex: War Kid, Studied in Spain, Strict 
Religious Upbringing, Refugee 
Use initial coding to 
develop categories 
from most significant 
and frequent codes. 
 
Ex: Distrust of 
Institutions, Prioritize 
Economic Solution, 
Prioritize Liberal 
Ideals, 
Review 
categories data 
using codes and 
categories. Look 
for patterns to 
test initial 
hypotheses 
and/or formulate 
new ones. 
TABLE 1 DEPICTS THE VARIOUS STEPS OF THE ANALYSIS PROCESS, INCLUDING EXAMPLES OF 
VARIOUS CODES FROM EACH CYCLE.   
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CHAPTER 5: HISTORICAL CONTEXT  
The outbreak of war in Bosnia was one of the many ripple effects of the breakup of Yugoslavia.   
Ethnic and religious identities play a central role in understanding the past and present of the 
Balkans and its peoples. Before delving into the immediate causes of the 1990s war in Bosnia and 
its aftermath, it is necessary to define terminology as it is used in this thesis, to refer to groups of 
peoples. These identities have been shaped by years of history, wars, empires, and coexistence. 
The inextricable nexus of religion and ethno-national identities in the Balkans can largely be traced 
back to the Ottoman Empire, during which people were governed and defined by their faith 
(Bennett, 2016, p. 18).  
  
Before continuing, it is essential to define the terminology that will be used in relation to ethnic 
groups and identities. Today’s Bosnia is largely composed of three ethnic groups: Croats, Serbs, 
and Bosniaks. Unless directly stated, the terms ‘Serb’ and ‘Croat’ will refer to Bosnian-Croats and 
Bosnian-Serbs. Often, “Bosniak” and “Muslims” are used interchangeably, however, for this 
research “Bosniaks” will be used to refer to Bosnian-Muslims. “Bosnian” will refer to all of 
Bosnia’s peoples, regardless of ethnicity or religion. In upcoming sections and chapters, this study 
will indicate the need for a ‘national identity’ referring to a collective Bosnian identity. When 
discussing the ethno-nationalist parties or divisions, it will be explicitly stated.  
BROTHERHOOD, UNITY, AND TITO 
Some trace the causes of the war back to the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire (Hagen & William, 
1999) and other even further to the days of Emperor Constantine and the Roman Empire (Doder, 
1993). While the history of the region and its peoples played a role in shaping the circumstances 
that led up to the conflict, the war in Bosnia occurred within the context of the breakup of 
Yugoslavia and the transition from socialism to democracy.   
  
The Republic of Yugoslavia was comprised of two autonomous provinces: Kosovo and Vojvodina, 
and six socialist republics: Croatia, Montenegro, Serbia, Slovenia, Macedonia, and Bosnia and 
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Herzegovina. This multi-ethnic Slavic country was best known for its charismatic leader, Josip 
Broz Tito. Tito’s promotion of ‘Brotherhood and Unity’ coupled with his stern leadership enabled 
him to ease ethnic divisions.  
 
The Yugoslav patriotism that promoted came crumbling down, shortly after the death of Tito 
in1980. Economic instability, debates over institutional structures, elite dynamics, and deficiencies 
in system legitimacy plagued the country in the decade following his death (Ramet, 2005 p. 55).  
Political elites, such as Serbian President Slobodan Milosovec flamed the fires of ethno-
nationalism in the face of the instability, promoting tension between groups that had previously 
coexisted, for the sake of their own nationalist agendas (Greenberg & McGuiness, 2000, p. 35; 
Wilmer, 2002 p. 138).  
THE OUTBREAK OF WAR IN BOSNIA 
The breakup of Yugoslavia formally began in 1991, as Slovenia and Croatia declared 
independence. A referendum was held on the question of succession from Yugoslavia on 29 
February- 1 March of 1992. At the time of the referendum, the Bosnian population was about 43% 
Bosniak, 35% Serb, and 18% Croat (Power, 2002 p. 248).  The nationalist Bosnian-Serb party 
boycotted the referendum, and in the end, the results showed 99.4 percent of voters in favor of 
Bosnian independence (Power, 2002 p. 248).  Shortly after Bosnia’s secession from Yugoslavia, 
the war erupted. Bosnian-Serbs violently opposed secession and fought to reunited with Serbia. 
Similarly displeased with the notion of becoming part of a new nation, Bosnian-Croats followed 
suit.  
Croats and Serbs fought Bosniaks, and at times each other, for control of territories which were 
largely populated by their ethnic groups. Further complicating the issue is the fact that these 
contested portions of land were not ethnically homogeneous. It was not as simple as just letting 
Serbs claim the territory they deemed as ‘Republika Srpska” for it was also largely inhabited by 
Bosniak and Croats. This led to the vile ethnic cleansing campaigns by Serbs, as they tried to clear 
Srpska of Bosniaks and Croats.  
DAYTON PEACE ACCORDS 
The 1994 Washington Agreement ended the violence between the Bosniaks and the Croats and 
created the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Chandler, 1999). A year later, the Dayton Peace 
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Accords were signed, officially bringing the war to an end and creating a high decentralized and 
deeply fragmented state. The Dayton Peace Accords recognized Republika Srpska, as a political 
entity. It divided Bosnia into two semi-independent entities, the Bosnkiak-Croat Federation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Serb Republika Srpska. Furthermore, it recognized Bosniaks, 
Croats, and Serbs as its three constituent peoples.   By doing so, Dayton formalized ethnic divisions 
and embedded them into the post-conflict structure (McMahon & Western, 2009, p. 69).  
 
The Dayton Agreement also established a democratic framework in the hopes that, “democratic 
governmental institutions and fair procedures best produce peaceful relations within a pluralist 
society” (General Framework Agreement for Peace, 1995, Annex 4).The eleven Annexes of 
Dayton gave the international community effective power over the Bosnian state and its 
institutions (Chandler, 1999, p. 44), leaving the peace process and democratization formally in the 
hands of international actors. Additionally, Dayton created the Office of the High Representative 
(OHR) in Bosnia to oversee the implementation of the treaty into the new political framework 
(Zürcher, et. al. 2013, pg. 55).  A year after the treaty was signed, 17 foreign governments, 18 UN 
agencies, 27 intergovernmental organizations and approximately 200 NGOs were actively 
involved in the peace process (McMahon & Western, 2009, p. 69).    
 
Provisions in the General Framework Agreement of Dayton called for future negotiations to 
determine the responsibilities of the central government and its institutions. However, the two 
entities had no desire to strengthen the central government and when the time came, the 
international community did not pressure them to do so (Bennett, 2017 p. 86). Instead, the power-
sharing framework has resulted in a highly decentralized state, and two entities with extensive 
political powers. Today this power-sharing political framework includes three presidents (one 
Bosniak, one Serb, and a Croat), almost 200 ministers, and over 700 members of parliament 
representing a population of 3.5 million people. Each of these three presidents has the power to 
veto legislation, often resulting in an impasse (McMahon & Western, 2009). Citizens who do not 
declare themselves as one of the three recognized constituent peoples, are excluded from holding 
certain offices and positions (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018).  
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CHAPTER 6: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
For a study founded in constructivist principles, it is essential to develop an understanding of the 
participants and the world around them. This entails a particular consideration of experiences that 
may have impacted the way in which they perceive the world around them, before developing 
conclusions. This section will outline the data gathered from the interviews and will be followed 
by a discussion section, in the following chapter, in which the data and analysis will be applied to 
the initial hypotheses.  
“LET’S START WITH THE BASICS”: AGE AND ETHNICITY 
The age of the interviewees ranged from 23-45, with half of participants aged between 23-27. 4 
These younger participants, born during the war or just before, were either born outside of Bosnia 
as refugees5  or in Sarajevo, where they remained with their families throughout the war. 6 Having 
been incredibly young when the war ended, they grew up in a post-conflict Bosnia, one recovering 
from a war that they did not remember. This generation has deemed themselves the ‘war kids’ and 
they stress that their views of the war, peacebuilding, and the Bosnian politics are significantly 
different than those of the older generations. 7  They have grown up with the aftermath and 
consequences of the war, in the midst of chaos and the peace process. In my research, I found that 
they held a lot of resentment towards the older generations, holding them responsible not just for 
the war,8 but also the current state of the country. Amna explains, “Since I was born during the 
war I blame my parents and my grandparents for the things that happened. I tell them this country 
sucks but it's their fault.”9 War kids have a unique perspective, in that their lives and the world 
around them have been impacted by an event that they did not experience of have any influence 
over. They have inherited the aftermath of a war that they do not see as their own.  
                                               
4 See Appendix A.2 
5 Sara, interview by Author, Sarajevo, BiH, 19 March 2018; Tarik, interview by Author, Sarajevo, BiH, 17 April, 2018.  
6 Emin, interview by Author, Sarajevo, BiH, 12 March, 2018; Živko, interview by Author, Sarajevo, BiH, 17 April, 2018; Luka, 
interview by Author 17 March, 2018; Abe, interview by Author, Sarajevo, BiH, 15 March, 2018. 
7 Tarik, [Interview] 2018; Luka, [Interview] 2018; Živko, [Interview] 2018; Sara, [Interview] 2018. 
8 Bakir, interview by Author; Sarajevo, BiH, 16 March, 2018; Abe, [Interview] 2018. 
9 Sara, [Interview] 2018. 
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However, it is to be noted that the perspectives of War Kids in Sarajevo are rather different than 
those who grew up outside of the city.  
 
“If you've been to Sarajevo you think ‘Oh things are getting better!’ but whoever comes 
here isn’t getting the whole picture. If you go to other federations there are small, small 
villages were you only have a church and a mosque or maybe a school. It's so easy to go 
there and preach about nationalism or whatever and these people are poisoned with the 
rhetoric.”10 
 
Sarajevo has long had a reputation for being multicultural. Though, this is not as common in rural 
areas, “When you’re from a smaller environment you are not so exposed to different people and 
different opinions” said Luka.11  This lack of exposure, Tarik expressed, makes the younger 
populations more susceptible to the “toxic” ideals of the older generations, “young people there 
are poisoned by their parents or grandparents.” 12  
 
Alma, 37 school teacher, who was a teenager living in Sarajevo during the war described it as the 
best times of her life. Admittedly, it was terrifying, but she described living with a sense of freedom 
and different set of priorities, “it was like time had stopped. Suddenly the only thing that mattered 
other than surviving, was living. So, we did.”  13 Similarly, I found that those who were teenagers 
during the war or lived in Sarajevo during the siege often referred to it with fondness, as a simpler 
time14 and highlighting the sense of community. 15 As such, they found it much more difficult to 
adapt to life after the war. Josip, 44, elaborates,  
 
“After the war ended there was an initial confusion, ‘what were we supposed to do now?’ 
Even after that, I don’t think that people or the government had any idea what to do with 
themselves or how to proceed. For years our main goal was survival, we shared food with 
                                               
10 Sara [Interview] 2018. 
11 Luka, [Interview] 2018. 
12 Tarik, [Interview] 2018. 
13 Alma, informal interview by Author, Sarajevo, BiH, 11 March, 2018.  
14 Elma, interview by Author, Sarajevo, BiH, 19 March 2018. 
15 Luka, [Interview] 2018; Amna, [Interview] 2018.   
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our neighbors, we looked out for one another. Suddenly it was back to looking for 
employment, or paying rent, finishing school, planning a career. None of it seemed 
important.”16  
 
The age at which the participants experienced the war and its aftermath have undoubtedly shaped 
their perceptions of the war and the world around them. As has their experience in Sarajevo, rather 
than in more ethnically homogeneous cities or villages.  
 
As ethnic identity has played a major role in Bosnia during the war, and in its aftermath, it was 
also something that I discussed with participants. After explaining the goals of the research and 
the structure of the interview, I began all of my interviews with the following statement “Let’s 
begin with the basics: age, gender, and ethnicity.” By lumping this question in with other simple, 
“matter of fact” questions, I hoped that the participants would answer quickly without giving it 
much thought. In response to this question, 5 participants replied with “Bosnian,” rather than the 
expected “Bosniak”, “Serb”, or “Croat”. 17  Some like Sara, simply said “I am Bosnian and 
Herzegovinian” without explaining further.18 Luka on the other hand explained “I identify myself 
as Bosnian, not those three main groups,” making it clear that he was deliberately rejecting the 
other classifications.19 Others like Elma, explained their identity further, “I am Bosnian. And 
Muslim. But I am Bosnian first,” explaining that while she recognizes herself to be Bosniak, she 
above all she prioritizes her national identity.20  
PERCEPTION OF PEACEBUILDING  
This thesis began with an initial assumption that participants would prioritize either nationbuilding 
activities or statebuilding activities. To determine this, I inquired about interviewees’ interests and 
needs after the war, and what they deemed as most important for the country. Concerns such as 
physical security, economy, and institutions were categorized as statebuilding while justice, social 
cohesion, and development of a national identity were categorized as nationbuilding.  However, 
                                               
16 Josip interview by Author, Sarajevo, BiH, 18 April 2018. 
17 See Appendix 2. Respondents that answered with “Bosnian” are given the label “BiH” and when possible, more information 
was added.  
18 Sara, [Interview] 2018. 
19 Luka, [Interview] 2018. 
20 Elma, [Interview] 2018. 
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in this research I found that locals did not prioritize one over the other. Most participants distinctly 
emphasized the need for both, at different stages of the peace process.   
  
The immediate concerns for most were security and infrastructure, particularly since the city of 
Sarajevo experienced massive destruction during the war and the siege.  It is then to be expected 
that many of the participants named the urgency for physical rebuilding and infrastructure, as an 
immediate concern at the end of the war. 21 Homes, hospitals, schools, and communities needed to 
be rebuilt. Bakir, 31, and his mother spent the war in Canada, as refugees, while his father remained 
in the Bosnian Army.22 Sara was born as a refugee in Croatia, while her father also remained in 
Sarajevo, fighting in the Bosnian Army. 23 Both Bakir and Sara emphasized that the main priorities 
for their families was reunification. For Raisa, whose family suffered a great loss in the massacre 
of Srebrenica, she and her family sought physical security, in its most literal sense.24  In the 
aftermath of the war, the initial priorities of the participants and their families, were based in 
personal insecurity (Conteh-Morgan, 2005).  
  
All participants, in one form or another, conveyed the need for nationbuilding and a collective 
Bosnian identity once a negative peace had been established. These sentiments bring to the 
foreground one of the lingering issues in Bosnian society: a lack of national identity. The manner 
in which five of the twelve participants chose to identify themselves, as Bosnian, shows a desire 
and dedication to the development of a national identity at the local level.  
 
What we really needed after the war was a whole new identity, a new country. Not 
Bosniaks, Croats, or Serbs. We should have come together as a brand-new country, with a 
new name. Instead we brought the baggage from the war with us and enforced divisions, 
making it impossible to come together as one country.25  
 
                                               
21 Emin, [Interview] 2018; Milena, interview by Author, Sarajevo, BiH, 15 April 2018. 
22 Bakir, [Interview] 2018. 
23 Sara, [Interview] 2018. 
24 Raisa’s father and two brothers were killed in the massacre of Srebrenica, along with several members of her extended family. 
Raisa, interview by Author, Sarajevo, BiH, 14 March 2018 
25Bakir, [Interview] 2018. 
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Instead, international actors focused on stopping the fighting, rather than addressing divisions.  
“The priority should’ve been to convince people that they weren’t enemies,” explained Živko, 
“that’s the part that didn’t succeed.”26 The continued absence of national unity is evident in two of 
Bosnia’s national symbols: a flag, to which many citizens feel little connection (Lakic, 2017) and 
a national anthem, which remains fully instrumental after 22 years, as authorities from the three 
ethno-national groups have been unable to reach a consensus on lyrics (Kovacevic, 2018). There 
was little focus on collective identity formation until it was already too late. “People adapt, after a 
while anything can become normal, even living in a fragmented country, for a lot of people the 
time to come together was after the war, now I think there’s no drive for it.” 27  The 
institutionalization of ethnic divisions was a recurring point in the interviews.  
 
It’s impossible to create actual progress when you have three groups of people working 
against each other for their own interests. So, if I’m being completely honest I think it was 
fucked from the start - [Dayton] set up us to fail. 28  
 
Milena, 35, summed up Dayton with the metaphor, “band-aids on bullet holes.”29  This simple 
response sums up a sentiment that was echoed throughout the many interviews, the political 
framework established by the Dayton Peace Treaty was a short-term solution that froze the 
conflict, rather than resolved it. While the division of power ensured that the three major ethnic 
groups, Croats, Bosniaks, and Serbs were all equally represented, it also formalized this separation.   
 
“There have been no real efforts from the politicians to unite Bosnians. Why would they? 
It has been benefitting them to keep us separated, distracted, too busy fighting with each 
other to point the finger at them.” 30 
 
Instead of progress, locals have seen political elites prosper in the aftermath of the war and 
continue to promote top-down ethno-nationalist rhetoric.31  It remains in their best interest to 
                                               
26 Živko, [Interview] 2018. 
27 Raisa [Interview] 2018. 
28 Živko, [Interview] 2018. 
29 Milena, interview by Author, Sarajevo, BiH, 15 April 2018 
30 Josip [Interview] 2018. 
31 Sara, [Interview] 2018; Milena, [Interview] 2018; Josip, [Interview] 2018. 
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continue in power, over a fragmented country. Alas, the interests of the local elites often 
overshadow those of the masses (Bandovic, 2017).  
CORRUPTION: CULTURE OR CIRCUMSTANCE? 
There was one overarching theme, that came up in each of the semi-structured interviews, and 
most of the informal unstructured interviews: corruption. For the purpose of this research, I have 
defined corruption as the misuse of public office for private gains (Melgar, Rossi, & Smith, 2010, 
p. 121). I found that the participants perceived corruption as widespread at micro and macro levels, 
and across various sectors.  
  
I was often told that it was common knowledge in Bosnia that the three presidents, Bakir 
Izetbegovic, Mladen Ivanic, and Dragan Čovic, are actually in league with one another and 
perpetuating nationalist agendas in order to distract from their own hidden agendas.32  “They go 
into meetings together, giving dirty looks to each other as they walk into the buildings. But once 
they’re inside and there’s no more television, no more cameras, then they drink together and laugh 
at what fools we are,” explained Emin.33 This mistrust of the Presidency in BiH is not a new 
development. In 2000, a World Bank report (p. 43) showed that 50% of the general population 
believed that corruption was widespread among the presidency.  
  
Both Elma and Luka detailed their experiences with corruption in the health sector. Elma, 42, a 
professional nurse, described the institutional corruption she witnessed while working in 
healthcare. One of the most significant, she says, was the cutting of staff wages in which the excess 
money was given to the party overseeing the health department.34 Luka shared the story of his 
family paying a bribe to a doctor, when his younger sister was unable to get proper care after 
suffering a serious leg injury two years ago.35 These two experiences illustrate the manners in 
which individuals are faced with corruption in their daily lives.  
  
                                               
32 Elma, [Interview] 2018; Živko, [Interview] 2018; Bakir, [Interview] 2018; Emin, [Interview] 2018. 
33 Emin, [Interview] 2018. 
34 Elma, [Interview] 2018.  
35 Luka, [Interview] 2018. 
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While all of the participants expressed disdain of corruption at institutional levels, some attitudes 
differed when it came to corruption in everyday life.   Živko for example, laughed as he told a 
story of how his friend keeps an envelope of money in his car, so that he can bribe the police 
officer in case he gets stopped for a traffic violation. He dismissed this kind of interaction as "part 
of Balkan culture." 36 While recent research has found evidence that personal characteristics play 
a role in perception of corruption (Melgar, Rossi, & Smith, 2010, p. 121), Živko suggests that 
Balkan people are more prone to participate in corruption at microlevels. Abe, attributes the 
scarcity of corruption in Yugoslavia to Tito’s “ability to keep the Balkan people in line.”37 These 
statements pose a significant question: if corruption becomes deeply engrained in a society, does 
it become cultural? If so, when? For some, giving in to corruption, at some level is inevitable. 
“Eventually, you will be presented with no other option, and you will be too desperate to refuse.”38 
This implies that corruption is not inherently cultural, it is circumstantial. If the basic needs of 
society were met, individuals would be less inclined to participate in the cycle corruption.  
 
Others outright refuse the assertion that corruption is cultural, instead they see this as justification: 
 
People always say, ‘it’s just the way things are done here, in Bosnia, in the Balkans, in 
Yugoslavia,’ but that is a lie, they say that because they do not want to admit that they have 
made it that way. By paying doctors or giving money to the [political] parties for a job they 
have created this cycle of corruption. 39 
 
In fact, it was the older participants, Elma, Josip, & Amna, that shared this sentiment, as all three 
of them described the levels of corruption significantly increasing after the war.40 This correlates 
with studies which assert that the climate and chaos of a post-conflict society, often breed 
corruption. Democratization introduces a new structure in a post-conflict society and initiates a 
change in power and political shift. These changes often create conditions in which corruption can 
                                               
36 Živko, [Interview] 2018. 
37 Abe, [Interview] 2018. 
38 Luka, [Interview] 2018. 
39 Here, Josip refers to individuals paying bribes to the hiring committees in institutions in order to receive a contract. This is seen 
as an investment. Source: Josip, [Interview] 2018. Also discussed in: Elma, [Interview] 2018; Amna, interview by Author, 
Sarajevo, BiH, 19 March 2018.  
40 Elma, [Interview] 2018; Josip, [Interview] 2018; Amna, [Interview] 2018.   
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thrive and grow. In the early stages of peacebuilding, corruption is often overlooked by 
international actors as it is seen as a tradeoff for stability (Belloni & Strazzari, 2014).  The problem 
is that these illegitimate ways of operating do not disappear on their own.  
INTERNATIONAL ACTORS: THE LESSER OF TWO EVILS 
Participants were asked to elaborate on whom they perceived were the main actors, local and 
international, involved and the focus of projects implemented in the peace process. Despite the 
extensive EU, UN, and US involvement delineated in the Annexes of the Dayton Peace Accords, 
many did not distinguish a large commitment of Western actors in the post-conflict peace process. 
“I think the Americans pulled out. There isn’t a lot of American influence here now, there hasn’t 
been since the end of the war.”41 
 
Instead, several participants named “other Muslim countries” as the large contributors to economic 
development after the war.42 Most recently, Saudi investors financed a €50 million shopping mall 
in Sarajevo (von der Brelie, 2018). Investments by conservative Islamic countries have raised 
alarm at the local level. “We now have communities here that have nothing to do with Bosnia. 
They are more Arabic, they come here and impose their rules because they have the money,” Sara 
explained.43 Despite the country’s need for foreign investment, many are suspicious of these 
foreign investments.  Tarik, 22, Bosniak Muslim stated “I see it like a trick. They are laundering 
money. They are using religion, these other countries or businesses from Muslim countries to get 
in and manipulate.”44  Mistrust is not solely reserved for Islamic actors, as interviewees also 
showed skepticism towards relations with Russia, Serbia, and Western actors. Some participants 
have concluded that like the political elites, international actors are profiting from the 
dysfunctional political system in Bosnia. 45  
 
Not all respondents had the shared the negative view of international actors in Bosnia. The most 
significant exception to this was Amna. Working as a business developer in Bosnia, she is well 
informed of the many projects undertaken by the EU and the US in terms of economic development 
                                               
41 Živko, [Interview] 2018. 
42 Emin, [Interview] 2018; Abe, [Interview] 2018; Josip, [Interview] 2018. 
43 Sara, [Interview] 2018. 
44 Tarik, [Interview] 2018 
45 Emin, [Interview] 2018; Abe, [Interview] 2018 
GALEANO-MUÑOZ 
 
37 
37 
and investments into small business.46 She admitted that many of these small businesses have 
failed, but ultimately, she says “if even just one out of every ten succeed, then we are making 
progress.” 47 Working towards EU accession has its benefits as well. While undoubtedly facing a 
long road ahead, interviewees expressed beliefs that the accession process will promote progress 
and stability in Bosnia in the long run.48   
 
When asked what the impact would be if all international actors pulled out of Bosnia, most 
answered that they believed that situations would worsen for the ordinary citizen. Even those that 
conveyed their distrust of international presence. “I don't think Bosnia could make it work on its 
own.”49  This response is particularly striking, considering many respondents’ contempt towards 
foreign involvement. It reflects the incredulous level of distrust towards the existing institutions 
and political framework. Milena explained that foreign actors and local politicians “are both in it 
for themselves, but at least [the international actors] are providing jobs and resources. It’s a choice 
between the lesser of two evils.”50 However, most alarming is the following response from Luka, 
which depicts a resigned acceptance of the corruption and inefficiency embedded in Bosnia’s 
political framework:  
 
The government would continue to do what it does, and continue to exploit people, the 
system, the constitution. Having all of the EU and other international institutions here is a 
positive pressure on the current government to follow that path [towards accession]. I think 
it’s a good thing, but it wouldn’t make much of a difference to Bosnians [if they left] 
because I’m not sure the government could get any lousier than this.51 
DEMOCRACY: IN THEORY AND IN PRACTICE 
Before asking participants about their perception of the state of democracy in Bosnia, it was 
imperative to first determine their own understanding of democracy and what it entails. For several 
respondents, their definition of democracy is minimalistic, reflecting the principles of an electoral 
                                               
46 Amna, [Interview] 2018.   
47 Amna, [Interview] 2018.   
48 Luka, [Interview] 2018; Sara, [Interview] 2018; Tarik, [Interview] 2018. 
49 Sara, [Interview] 2018. 
50 Milena, [Interview] 2018.  
51 Luka, [Interview] 2018. 
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democracy. “For me, it’s majority rules,” explained Tarik.52 For Elma, democracy “means that I 
can sit here, and talk openly with you, regardless of your ethnicity, religion, race. It means I can 
go to the mosque as much as I want to.” 53 Similarly, Josip, Sara, and Raisa’s definitions of 
democracy emphasize the prominence of individual freedoms and civil liberties that define a 
liberal democracy.54 
 
As for the current framework of democracy in Bosnia, there is a general consensus by participants 
that it is an electoral democracy, at best. “We have democracy in the sense that the person that you 
voted for it will be in a position of power. But actually getting what you vote for? That’s a different 
story.” The democratic process that participants describe is one in which the government has 
minimal accountability to its citizens. There is even little faith in the legitimacy of elections.55 
Both Tarik and Živko admit to being approached by ethno-nationalist parties, offering bribes for 
votes.56   
 
Some participants raised concern over the lack of liberal values in Bosnia’s version of democracy, 
specifically civil liberties and human rights. Bakir noted that Dayton recognizes only Croats, 
Bosniaks, and Serbs as its constituents. This excludes its significant Roma and Jewish populations 
from political representation.57 Additionally, others pointed out the dangerous circumstances of 
vulnerable groups, such as the mass discrimination and violent attacks of the LGBT community58 
and lack of protection for persons with disabilities.59  In the last two years, Bosnia’s Civil Liberties 
ranking in Freedom House’s annual Freedom in the World increased from 3 to 4 (Freedom House, 
2016, 2018), signaling that these issues are not improving.60   
 
Tarik reasons that civil liberties should not be the priority of Bosnia at the moment:  
                                               
52 Tarik, [Interview] 2018. 
53 Elma, [Interview] 2018. 
54 Sara, [Interview] 2018; Josip, [Interview] 2018; Raisa [Interview] 2018.  
55Raisa, [Interview] 2018; Milena, [Interview] 2018. 
56 Tarik, [Interview] 2018; Živko, [Interview] 2018. 
57 Bakir, [Interview] 2018.  
58 Sara, [Interview] 2018. 
59 Josip, [Interview] 2018; Tarik, [Interview] 2018. 
60 On a scale from 0 to 7, with 0 being the “Most Free”, and 7 “Least Free.” Full methodology available at: Freedom House, 
2018. https://freedomhouse.org/report/methodology-freedom-world-2018.  
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There are organizations now, for things like [LGBT] rights. But the thing is … people here 
don’t have jobs. They have bigger things to worry about. Yes, [civil rights and protections] 
would be nice, but this country has bigger problems. First, secure fundamental needs and 
good economy and then the rest will come. 61 
 
This statement reveals several aspects about Tarik’s beliefs and values. First, he does not define 
civil liberties as fundamental rights. Tarik is not alone in this belief, as Pietsch, Miller, and Karp 
(2015, p. 4) have recently asserted that citizens accept restrictions on their civil liberties in favor 
of political and economic security. Second, it reveals that Tarik, and others 62 hold the belief that 
economic development and political stability progress towards liberal values and liberties. This 
reflects the idea that socialism evolves towards liberalism. Nevertheless, it must do so at its own 
pace.  
I think we were moving towards democracy slowly [before the war], but people were not 
ready for it the way it came. We were not there yet.  For people, democracy was what 
stopped the war, and it meant that they were not going to get killed. [They thought,] ‘If 
that’s democracy, I’ll take it.’ I don’t think people were fully aware of the what democracy 
mean, and at that point it didn’t even matter.63 
 
Abe echoes this sentiment, adding that "democracy was an ideal that no one wanted. It was forced 
on us. [Bosnians] just wanted a better life, they never actually cared under which system.” 64 These 
statements reflect academic claims that in order to succeed post-conflict democratization needs 
support from local elites (Zürcher, 2001 p. 9) and demand for democracy from citizens (Parra-
Rosales, 2009). Without the right political climate, it is unlikely that it will truly succeed.  
 
Approximately half of the participants openly rejected the notion of democracy. Amna discards 
democracy on the theoretical premise, insisting that there is no such thing as a “true democracy” 
                                               
61 Tarik, [Interview] 2018. 
62 Amna, [Interview] 2018; Luka. [Interview] 2018. 
63 Luka. [Interview] 2018. 
64 Abe, [Interview] 2018. 
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in Bosnia or anywhere else. “There is always someone else pulling the strings, so why pretend to 
give people the choice?” 65 On a similar note, Abe reasons that: 
Tito had a better idea of what people needed and what needed to be done in the country. 
He was able to accomplish them, rather than trying to go around and create a facade that 
people knew what they wanted or what was needed.66 
 
Several interviewees also shared this opinion.67 One participant bluntly stated that: “some people 
are just too stupid to be allowed to vote.”68 Participants holding this view argue that the ordinary 
citizen cannot possibly know what is best for the country at large and should not be entrusted with 
such decisions. It is worth speculating whether these participants would hold the same view, if 
they were experiencing a less corrupt and fractured version of democracy. 
  
                                               
65 Amna, [Interview] 2018.  
66 Abe, [Interview] 2018. 
67 Emin, [Interview] 2018. 
68 Živko, [Interview] 2018. 
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CHAPTER 7: DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION 
 
CORRUPTION IS A CANCER, A CANCER THAT EATS AWAY AT A CITIZEN’S FAITH IN 
DEMOCRACY, DIMINISHES THE INSTINCT FOR INNOVATION AND CREATIVITY; ALREADY-
TIGHT NATIONAL BUDGETS, CROWDING OUT IMPORTANT NATIONAL INVESTMENTS.  IT 
WASTES THE TALENT OF ENTIRE GENERATIONS.  IT SCARES AWAY INVESTMENTS AND 
JOBS.  AND MOST IMPORTANTLY IT DENIES THE PEOPLE THEIR DIGNITY.  IT SAPS THE 
COLLECTIVE STRENGTH AND RESOLVE OF A NATION.  CORRUPTION IS JUST ANOTHER FORM 
OF TYRANNY. 
JOE BIDEN, REMARKS TO ROMANIAN CIVIL SOCIETY 
GROUPS AND STUDENTS, BUCHAREST, 21 MAY, 2014.  
 
DISCUSSION 
Prior to conducting the interviews, I developed two initial hypotheses (see Figure 1, below), 
centering them around concepts that I had anticipated to be central to answering the research 
question:  How have local perceptions of post-conflict democratization and peacebuilding 
strategies impacted perceptions of democracy? I had expected that these hypotheses would 
evolve and develop as my research continued, and they did. Using the extensive data collected 
throughout my fieldwork, I was able to reevaluate and reanalyze these initial premises. Upon doing 
so I found that I had, unintentionally, incorporated my own assumptions into the rational and 
reasoning behind these hypotheses.  
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FIGURE 1: INITIAL AND CONCLUDING HYPOTHESES 
FIGURE 1 LISTS THE TWO INITIAL HYPOTHESES, USED AS A FRAMEWORK FOR INTERVIEWS AND THE 
COLLECTION OF DATA, AND THE TWO CONCLUDING HYPOTHESES, DEVELOPED FROM ANALYSIS OF 
DATA. 
 
LACK OF NATIONBUILDING  
Shortly after the first few interviews were conducted, it was evident that IH.1 would, at the very 
least, need to be amended. As discussed in the results section, participants did not prioritize one 
over the other and instead expressed a need for both nationbuilding and statebuilding initiatives. 
The interviewees identified the needs for infrastructure, physical security, economic security, 
political stability, and the construction of a collective national identity. 23 years after the signing 
of Dayton, participants perceive no significant efforts made towards the establishment of a 
collective Bosnian identity, and continue to cite ethnic divisions and fragmentation as one of the 
country’s most prominent issues.  
 
Moreover, the data also revealed a consensus regarding the type of democracy implemented in 
Bosnia. According to participants, Bosnia’s political framework is far from earning the title of 
liberal democracy. Instead they largely expressed a system in which citizens could vote and elect 
their representatives, but still faced limitations of civil liberties and political freedoms.  
 
IH.1 incorporated the relevant concepts. Nevertheless, it was based on the flawed assumptions that 
locals will prioritize one element of a concept over another, such as nationbuilding over 
• Locals who prioritize nationbuilding over statebuilding initiatives in peacebuilding will place a greater value on 
liberal ideals than democratic institutions in the democratization process.
Initial Hypothesis 1: 
• Locals who still feel at risk due to stagnant or unfulfilled peacebuilding initiatives are more likely to be 
skeptical of democratic institutions and ideals.
Initial Hypothesis 2: 
• H1: Locals who perceive a lack of nationbuilding initiatives in the peace process are more likely to also distinguish the 
absence of established liberal ideals in their post-conflict society.
Hypothesis 1:
• Perception of widespread corruption deteriorates the legitimacy of the post-conflict democracy through 
shared beliefs
Hypothesis 2:
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statebuilding, or democratic institutions over liberal values. This suggests that these priorities are 
established out of preference, rather than circumstance or necessity. Therefore, initial hypothesis 
1 has been revised and developed into a new hypothesis:   
H1: Locals who perceive a lack of nationbuilding initiatives in the peace process are more 
likely to also distinguish the absence of established liberal ideals in their post-conflict 
society. 
 
In both peacebuilding and democratization processes, locals have identified a shortcoming in the 
establishment of ideational factors. Namely, international actors have been unsuccessful at 
establishing shared values and collective ideals. It seems reasonable to assert that these two factors 
are linked: where there is a want for nationbuilding, there will likely be a shortage of established 
liberal ideals.   
LINKING CORRUPTION AND INSECURITY 
IH.2 focused on “participants who still feel at risk,” making the assumption that those who still 
perceived a level of insecurity. would be more cynical of the post-conflict democracy, which failed 
to ensure their security. When initially developing IH.2, it is abundantly clear that I underestimated 
the widespread insecurity still suffered by locals. From the interviews conducted, participants 
identified three key issues in present day Bosnia: widespread corruption, absence of collective 
identity, and economic insecurity. Each of the participants revealed that they personally faced 
some level of insecurity, mostly economic. 
 
Initially, I approached this study with the assumption that peacebuilding was the means, to which 
the end goal was democracy. However, this notion is as misguided as the assumption that 
democracy inherently brings peace and stability. The end goal, particularly for locals, is peace and 
stability. Democracy, I found, is the means by which this goal is to be attained. If the means falls 
short of realizing the goal, it is the means of achieving it that changes, not the objective. The results 
of this study show that the “goal” of participants remained the same: security and stability. There 
were, however, great discrepancies when it came to how to best achieve this.  
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Academics have largely agreed that democracy is the preferred political system (Ottoway, 2009; 
Ohlson & Kovacs, 2009). This sentiment is also reflected outside the academic sphere, as recent 
studies have shown broad support for democratic systems and liberal values, among individuals 
globally (Pew Research Center, 2015, 2017).  During post-conflict democratization, international 
actors must find a balance between countering possible resentment from locals and establishing a 
workable and efficient political framework (von Bogdandy et. al., 2005, p. 596). However, in the 
case of Bosnia neither of these were goals were met with full success, resulting in the perception 
of widespread corruption, eroding the legitimacy of the established institutions. 
 
Perception of corruption can impact citizens’ opinions of democratization and its end goals. The 
insecurities faced by locals are rooted in this corruption. They recognize that the institutions before 
them are incapable of addressing their needs, and therefore their shared belief, is one of doubt and 
mistrust in their political system. As Dagher (2018) explains, legitimacy is obtained through four 
processes: international legitimacy, process legitimacy, performance legitimacy, and shared 
beliefs. Based on the data from these interviews, there is no shared belief that democracy is the 
preferred political system. Therefore, it innately deteriorates the legitimacy. A new hypothesis has 
been developed to represent these findings:  
H2: Perception of widespread corruption deteriorates the legitimacy of the post-conflict 
democracy through shared beliefs.  
 
Arguably, widespread corruption also impacts the performance legitimacy of a nation, as it 
impedes their ability to provide basic needs for its citizens. However, the focus of this study is not 
on the government’s capabilities, but on locals’ perspectives of their government’s capabilities.  
CONCLUSION  
Understanding shared beliefs and perceptions at the local level is imperative for evaluating the 
legitimacy of a democracy. In post-conflict peacebuilding, the interests and needs of locals are 
often overlooked by international actors in their haste to build democratic institutions. It is this 
peace process that designates the development of a democratic society, and therefore it is this peace 
process that influences the shared beliefs and political culture, whether intentional or not.  
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This research is not concluding with a definite theory to explain the relationship between locals’ 
perceptions of the peace process and their views of democracy, in terms of both institutions and 
values. However, it has contributed to the development of a new theory by developing two new 
hypotheses, to be applied and explored in future studies.  
 
First, the results of this study find that where peacebuilding fails to address the ideational concerns, 
such as national identity and reconciliation, it likely fails to integrate liberal values into the political 
culture. In the case of Bosnia, there was no focus on developing a collective national identity, and 
later no focus on instilling liberal values to complement the establishment of democratic 
institutions.  
 
Finally, this thesis also concludes that when corruption is allowed to flourish and grow during a 
peace process, it not only impacts the capability of a state, but also threatens its legitimacy. As 
findings showed, participants perceived widespread corruption in Bosnia’s political framework. In 
turn, they expressed vast mistrust of their current government, as well as skepticism towards 
democracy as the political framework. These shared beliefs depreciate the legitimacy of Bosnia’s 
current government.  
 
This study faced several limitations particularly due to time and resources. Unfortunately, it is 
difficult, if not impossible, to generalize the results of Bosnians in Sarajevo, to all of Bosnia, and 
more so to all post-conflict transition countries. Future research is needed to strengthen the findings 
of this research and test its relevance at a broader level. Due to significant time and resource 
restrictions, this study was not as representative of the Bosnian people as had been intended. 
Therefore, a follow up study is recommended using the same case study of Bosnia, with a larger 
sample size and a more representative sample in terms of age, location, and ethnicity. A final 
limitation, is the use of a single case for a theory development study.   Therefore, this needs to be 
applied more broadly, outside of Bosnia. Overall, a greater emphasis needs to be placed on the 
individuals within a society, when evaluating the success of peacebuilding initiatives and 
democratization.  
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX 1: SAMPLE QUESTIONNAIRE  
 
Introduction: 
- Name/Age/Ethnicity/Gender (Bosniak, Serb, Croat) 
- Years of schooling/level of education/Occupation 
- Political Participation  
 
Biographical: 
- Tell me a bit about you. How long have you been in Sarajevo? 
- Where did you live before? 
- What was life like before the war? / Do you know much about your family/parents’ lives 
before? 
 
Peacebuilding 
Can you tell me a bit about the initial healing and rebuilding process after the war? What did you 
see changing or going on around you (family/home, community, and government)?  
- immediately after, 5 years, 10 years 
- key players, what was the focus?  
- Are you aware of any projects? Did you participate?  
- if younger, what you’ve heard, or learned, etc 
- if “none”: How did Bosnia get from “then” to now? Or does it remain the same? 
 
What do you think was most important to healing and post-conflict reconstruction after the war? 
And what do you think is most important now? 
- What were your main concerns? Or “peoples main concerns? 
- (Ex: Reconciliation, justice, security, economic development, infrastructure?)  
 
How do you feel about the state of reconciliation and rebuilding in Bosnia today?  
- Why do you think that is?  
- In which ways does this impact your daily life?  
- Or the daily life of Bosnians? 
 
Personally, what would you say are your biggest concerns in regard to Bosnia’s current state? 
- Can you elaborate, or give examples? 
 
 
What role did foreign countries or organizations play immediately after the war? What role do they 
play now? 
- If all international actors were to leave, how would that impact Bosnia? 
 
 
Democracy: 
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What is your definition of democracy? (in general) 
 
How do you view the state of democracy in Bosnia today?  
- Does it exist in Bosnia, does it match your definition of democracy? Why/Why not? 
- Political representation/elections? Institutions that were constructed after the war?)   
- Quality of life in “democracy” vs life in socialism? 
 
You mentioned (politics, dishonesty, economy, ethnic tensions/divisions ….) can you elaborate, 
or give me examples?  
- Why do you think this is? 
 
What do you think can be done to correct this?  
- Is something being done now? Is it working?  
- Whose responsibility is it? 
- Depending on answer:  To what extent is ______ more/less important than respecting 
individual freedoms/democratic values/etc?  
 
What role did foreign countries or organizations play immediately after the war? What role do they 
play now? 
- If all international actors were to leave, how would that impact Bosnia? 
 
 
Corruption 
Can you tell me a bit about your routine interactions with (give example: paying a fine/ticket, 
healthcare, applying for universities, applying for government job, etc) 
 
Is it the same across sectors (other examples) and at all levels?  
- Highest levels (politicians, institutions), lowest levels (individuals, citizens)?  
- Across which sectors? (local gov., police, health, educations, private sector, etc) 
 
To what extent do you see it in your daily life? 
- Can you give me examples? (if possible, personal examples?) 
- Why do you think it exists to this extent? 
- Who is benefitting?  
 
How can corruption be decreased? 
- Who is making the greatest efforts? 
 
What kind of political system do you think would be best for Bosnia?  
- Can it address corruption (or issues mentioned)?  
 
 
Did I miss anything? Is there something else you think I should know? 
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APPENDIX 2: LIST OF INTERVIEWEES 
TABLE A.1: LIST OF INTERVIEWEES  
 
Name 
 
Date of  
Interview 
 
Interview 
Location 
 
Age 
 
Gender 
 
Ethnicity 
 
Occupation 
 
War Experience 
Luka 17 March, 2018 Kino Meeting Point, Sarajevo 27 Male 
BiH, Family is 
Muslim, Atheist. 
Data visualization, 
programming 
Born as war began, 
remained in Sarajevo with 
family 
Bakir 16 March, 2018 Jazzbina, Sarajevo 31 Male Bosniak Event promoter and coordinator 
Went with family to 
Canada as a refugee, 
father remained in 
Bosnian army throughout 
war 
Amna 19 March, 2018 Monolo, Sarajevo 37 Female BiH, Muslim Business Developer Remained in Sarajevo with family 
Elma 19 March, 2018 Monolo, Sarajevo 42 Female BiH, Muslim Nurse Remained in Sarajevo with family 
Sara 19 March, 2018 Kino Meeting Point, Sarajevo 24 Female BiH, Student 
Born a refugee in Croatia, 
father remained in 
Bosnian army throughout 
war 
Živko 17 April, 2018 Kino Meeting Point, Sarajevo 23 Male Serb Student 
Born in Sarajevo during 
war 
Tarik 17 April, 2018 Kino Meeting Point, Sarajevo 23 Male Bosniak Unemployed 
Born in Germany during 
war, family fled before 
outbreak of violence, 
joined father in Germany. 
Returned after war 
Abe 15 March, 2018 The Bar, Sarajevo 23 Male BiH, father Serb mother Croat Server 
Born in Sarajevo during 
war 
Emin 12 March, 2018 Café Tito, Sarajevo 27 Male Serb Hotel Receptionist Remained in Sarajevo with family 
Raisa 14 March, 2018 Café Tito, Sarajevo 36 Female Bosniak Store Clerk, Tour Guide 
Survived Srebrenica, lost 
family during the 
massacre. Moved to 
Sarajevo 10 years ago 
Milena 15 April, 2018 Zlatna Ribica, Sarajevo 35 Female Croat 
Project coordinator, 
tourism 
Lived in Mostar during 
war, moved to Sarajevo for 
university. 
Josip 18 April, 2018 The Bar, Sarajevo 44 Male Croat Restaurant manager Stayed in Sarajevo during war 
  
BUILDING PEACE OR DEMOCRACY? 
 
60 
60 
APPENDIX 3: DETAILED CODING EXAMPLE 
 
 
TABLE A.2: OUTLINE OF CODING CYCLES WITH DETAILED EXAMPLE 
1st Cycle, Step 1: 
Attribute Coding 
Attributes: 
Name, Age, Gender, Ethnicity, 
Occupation, Interview Date and 
Location 
 
Concept Index 
 
Example 
Name: Luka, Age: 27, Gender: Male, Ethnicity: BiH, Occupation: Programmer, 
Data Visualization Date: 17 March 2018, Location: Kino Meeting Point, 
Sarajevo 
 
Concept Index:  War Kid (E); National Identity (V); Corruption (E), No 
“Yugonostalgia” (A); Liberal Values (V), Role of Media (A);  Civic Responsibility 
(V),  Political Participation (E);  Economic Solution (A), 
 
1st Cycle, Step 2: 
Initial and Values 
Coding 
 
Initial Coding: 
Short phrase to Summarize Unit 
 
4 Values Codes: 
Values (V): Liberal Values, Identity, 
Nationalism, 
Attitudes (A): Opinions of 
Participants (Responsible for War, 
Distrust of International Actors, 
Yugonostalgia) 
Needs (N):  Immediate Post-Conflict 
Needs, Present Day Needs, 
Personal Needs, Needs of State 
Experiences (E): Unemployment, 
Refugee, War Kid, Well-Traveled, 
 
Sub-Code: 
Emerging concepts, possible 
categories (Nationbuilding, 
Statebuilding, Economic Solutions, 
Legitimacy, Democratic Skepticism) 
 
 
 
Example 
 
Values: Identifies BiH (National Identity); Atheist; Free Speech (Liberal Values); 
Reconciliation on “human” rather than religious level (Nationbuilding/Identity); 
Acknowledge Past & Move On; Right to Vote Should be Earned (Democracy) ; 
Secure Needs and Divisions Disappear (Economic Solution); 
 
Needs: Housing and Rebuilding, (Post-War Need, Statebuilding); National Unity 
(Post-War Need, Nationbuilding) Adequate Healthcare (Present Need, 
Corruption); Mass Emigration Crisis (Economy); 
 
Attitudes: Participating in Corruption Inevitable (Corruption); Reconciliation 
Conferences/Workshops are Exploited (Nationbuilding); Ethnic Divisions 
Decreasing (National Identity); Divisions Decreased in Younger Generations; 
Lack of Local Capacity (Post-War, Peacebuilding); Distrust of International 
Community; War was Due to Failure of International Community; Pessimistic 
Politically (Legitimacy);  Lack of Infrastructure Hurts Economy (Economy); 
International Community Benefitting Chaos and Corruption; 
Peacebuilding/Reconciliation Continues Today through EU Application; Test to 
Vote (Skepticism of Democracy), Social Issues Important Not Priority; Socialism 
Provided Security; Democracy Doesn’t Work; 
 
Experiences: War Kid; Always lived in Sarajevo; Healthcare Corruption 
(Corruption); Attended Reconciliation Workshops; Previously Politically Active; 
Participated 2014 Protests; Noam Chomsky; Worked as Part of Census Team; 
Employed by American Company Outsourced in Bosnia; 
2nd Cycle: 
Focused Coding 
Use initial coding to develop 
categories from most significant 
and frequent codes. 
Example: 
Codes: Emigration, Prioritize Local Business, Secure Needs and Divisions 
Disappear, Lack of Infrastructure Hurts Economy, Prioritize Jobs and Business, 
Social Issues Important Not Priority, Socialism Provided Security 
 
Category: Prioritize Economic Solution 
APPENDIX 3 USES A PARTIAL LIST OF CODES FROM A SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW. SOURCE:  LUKA, 
INTERVIEW WITH AUTHOR, 17 MARCH, 2018 
